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Notes
Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process:
Some Constitutional Considerations
The concept of pretrial diversion has emerged within recent years
as a major issue in the ongoing debate over solutions to one of our most
perplexing social problems, the soaring crime rate. The promise of a
more humane system of criminal justice to solve this problem has given
added impetus to diversion's popularity.
Diversion is a procedure for the "disposition of a criminal com-
plaint without a conviction, the noncriminal disposition being conditioned
on either the performance of specified obligations by the defendant,
or his participation in counseling or treatment."' An accused meeting
certain eligibility criteria is offered an opportunity to agree to participate
in a rehabilitative program while his prosecution is suspended. If he
successfully completes the program, the charge is dismissed. If he fails,
he is channeled through the regular criminal process.
Amidst a flurry of recent studies indicating diversion can be suc-
cessful in reducing recidivism, scant attention has been given to its
legality. Traditional principles concerning judicial supervision, assist-
ance of counsel, the right to a speedy trial, and -the privilege against
self-incrimination which inhere in the regular criminal process, have
been glossed over in the haste to implement a promising new concept. The
constitutional domestication of pretrial diversion would protect indi-
vidual liberties that ultimately shield a free society while preserving the
benefits shown to accrue to communities having e3tablished diversion
programs.
This note will focus exclusively upon diversion to community-
based rehabilitation programs, which normally involve counseling,
training, and job placement for periods up to one year. Solutions for
the constitutional shortcomings of intake procedures of recently estab-
lished programs, as well as a means of implementing a model diversion
program in Indiana, will be proposed.
1 R. NIMMER, DIVERsIoN: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION
(1974).
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DIVERSION: GOALS AND BENEFITS
Pretrial diversion has been defined as
a formalized procedure authorized by legislation, court rule, or, most
commonly, by informal prosecutorial consent, whereby persons
who are accused of certain criminal offenses and meet preestablished
criteria have their prosecution suspended for a three month to one
year period and are placed in a community-based rehabilitation
program. The rehabilitation program may include counseling,
training, and job placement. If conditions of the diversion referral
are satisfied, the prosecution may be nolle prossed or the case dis-
missed; if not, the accused is returned for normal criminal process-
ing.2
Pretrial diversion's most immediate goal is the reduction of reci-
divism.' In theory, diversion acts to reduce recidivism in three ways:
(1) An accused is put into a community-based treatment program that
maintains the stable ties which he has with his family, his community,
or his employment, instead of severing them as incarceration does.'
(2) The attempt at rehabilitation is begun while the offender still feels
the impact of his arrest instead of after the long delays now present in
our criminal justice system.5 Immediately after arrest the offender is
believed to be in the best psychological state for rehabilitation efforts
because his sense of guilt is greatest, he has not had time to rationalize
his behavior, and his ties with the community are still intact.6 (3)
The offender avoids the criminal stigma which not only burdens his
acceptance by society but acts as a "self-fulfilling and internalizing
perception" encouraging him to act out his social role as a criminal.'
Experience with recent diversion programs appears to bear out the
predicted reduction in recidivism.'
2 Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974).
3 See S. RE_'. No. 417, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
417]; see also Statement of Robert Leonard, prosecuting attorney of Genesee County,
Michigan, in Hearings on S. 798 Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 412 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 798].
4 See S. REP. No. 417, at 7.
5 See id. at 13.
" See id.
7 See id. at 12.
8 The Manhattan Court Employment Project designed in 1967 by the Vera Institute
of Justice and Project Crossroads of Washington, D.C., funded by the Department of
Labor, were two early manpower model diversion projects in which recidivism rates of
the groups that successfully completed the rehabilitation programs were compared with
control groups. The Manhattan Project found that the recidivism rate in the diverted
group was 15.8 percent, while the rate in the control group was 30.1 percent. Statement
of Ennis J. Olgiati, Director of the Court Employment Project, in Hearings on S. 3309
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Another important goal of pretrial diversion is said to be the
economizing of judicial and prosecutorial resources. By diverting an
accused early in the criminal process, the costs of the subsequent formal
proceedings are avoided. The time saved can be then applied to prose-
cution of more serious or recidivist offenders.9
Prosecutors might see diversion as an additional option beyond
traditional alternatives of charge or dismissal." Courts and legislators
may view diversion as a mechanism for modifying the present employ-
ment of the criminal sanction against criminal conduct only marginally
deserving of the criminal stigma yet showing need of rehabilitation."
Diversion adds a new dimension to the legal system's arsenal of re-
sponses to conduct defined as dangerous to the welfare of society. Di-
version also has the potential for expansion to more serious crimes
where rehabilitation can be effective. Society and the individual also
benefit when offenders who may just be beginning a pattern of criminal
behavior are diverted into productive lawful employment. 2
Before the Subcoinm. on National Penitentiaries of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 45-52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearinfos on S. 3309]. Project
Crossroads also found favorable results: a 22.2 percent rearrcst rate for the diverted
group as compared to a 45.7 percent rate for the control group. S. REP. No. 417, at 7.
See also Statement from the Project Crossroads, in Hearings on S. 3309, at 88-91. It
was the apparent success of these initial projects that prompted the Department of Labor
to fund a second round of model diversion projects. S. REP. No. 417, at 9. One com-
mentator, however, has severely criticized the validity of the methodology employed in
assessing the recidivism rates in the earlier model programs. Note, supra note 2, at
847-48 nn.112 & 113.
0 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISoRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COUmTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ADvisORY-
COMm'N, COURTS], reprinted in Hearings on S. 798, at 520-21.
10 STATE OF MICHIGAN OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEFERRED PROSEcu--
TION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF THE GENESEE COUNTY CITIZENS PROBA--
TION AUTHORITY (1972) [hereinafter cited as A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A.], reprinted in,
Hearings on S. 798, at 440, 443. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM''X ON LAW ENFORCEMENT-
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmIY 133
(1967) [hereinafter cited as CRIME CouM'N REPORT].
11 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, COURTS at 520.12Offsetting the benefits of diversion are the potential dargers inherent in such a
system. One commentator posits this concern:
The extensive diversion of offenders may also tend to divert legislative attention
from other aspects of needed judicial reform. Relief frcm the stigma of a
criminal record through diversion must not prevent reformation of statutes
dealing with expungement of criminal records. Legislative efforts must con-
tinue to prevent arbitrary discrimination by employers-bAth public and pri-
vate-in the hiring of persons with criminal records. And efforts should con-
tinue to restrict the availability of criminal records to persons outside the
criminal justice system.
Statement of J. Gordon Zaloom, Project Director, Hudson County Pretrial Intervention
Project, in Hearings on S. 3309, at 105. Also, diversion should not be viewed as an al-
ternative solution to the present controversy concerning the decriminalization of victim-
less criminal behavior. Id.
One troubling statement made by the National Advisory Commission is worthy of
1975]
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HISTORY OF DIVERSION PROGRAMS
Pretrial diversion is a new concept only in the sense that programs
now employing this term follow formal procedures and apply stan-
dardized eligibility criteria for the purpose of making the diversion
decision on a large scale. The basic concept of diversion, however, is
not new. Prosecutors have long employed diversion on an individual
basis by deferring prosecution upon the condition that the offender
seek psychiatric assistance, if it appeared that a mental disturbance had
contributed toward the criminal conduct." Prosecutions were often
suspended if the accused agreed to seek out employment, enter the
military, or undergo some form of rehabilitative treatment."' Typical
of the trend towards a more organized diversion procedure was the
development of the juvenile court system, whose goal was to divert
juveniles into rehabilitation without attaching the stigma of a criminal
conviction. A major difficulty with these programs was that while the
offender was effecively diverted from the stigma and harshness of the
criminal sanction, he was likewise diverted from the assertion of con-
stitutional safeguards which attach in the course of the normal criminal
process."3
Large-scale diversion, other than. in the juvenile justice system,
is a recent innovation whose constitutionality has not yet been estab-
lished in the courts. The first such program was inaugurated in 1965
in Genesee County, Michigan, under the name Court of No Record. 6
In 1968 it evolved into its present structure under the name Citizens'
Probation Authority (C.P.A.)." The formation of diversion pro-
grams was spurred by the publication in 1967 of a study undertaken
by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad-
ministration of Justice, which recommended diversion as a possible
extensive debate before legislators, judges, or prosecutors decide to make diversion a
permanent part of our criminal justice system:
Many of the same objectives sought through diversion can be accomplished if
the sentencing judge had authority to sentence a convicted offender to a diver-
sion program and the jurisdiction had an expungment statute to permit removal of
formal records of conviction following successful participation in such a pro-
gram.
NATIONAL ADviSORY ComM'N, COuRTS at 531.
1 ABA PRojEcr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL. JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DENSE FuNcrIoN 91 (tent. draft 1970) (commentary
to Standard 3.8 of the Prosecution Function).
"4 Id.
15 n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
1 Statement of Robert Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney of Genesse County, Michigan,
in Hearings on S. 798, supra note 3, at 410; S. RF. No. 417, at 7.
17 A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A. at 443.
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solution to the problem of recidivism.' The Department of Labor
began funding model diversion programs in seven metropolitan areas,"9
among which was the Hennepin County Pre-Trial Diversion Project
in Minneapolis, started in 1971, operating under the name Operation
De Novo. In 1972, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established
by court rule a diversion procedure called "Accelerated Rehabilitative
Disposition" (A.R.D.), modeled after an existing program in Phil-
adelphia.2" At the federal level, the Senate adopted the Community
Supervision and Services Act in 1973, proposed as Senate Bill Number
798, although the bill died in committee in the House."- Although
the four programs named above-C.P.A., De Novo, A.R.D. & Senate
Bill No. 798-do not exhaust the list of variations of diversion pro-
grams that have been instituted recently, they are representative of the
differing ways in which diversion programs can overlook-or assure-
the safeguarding of the accused's constitutional rights in the course
of the diversion process.
How THE DIVERSION PROCESS OPERATES
Although procedures for channeling defendants through the regular
criminal process vary among jurisdictions, the intake stage usually
begins with an arrest followed quickly by police booking, detention and
the filing of a charge. Most states have statutes requiring an arrested
person be brought before a magistrate within a reasonable time22 for
the purposes of informing him of the charge, his constitutional rights,
appointing counsel if he is indigent,2 and setting bail. This stage is
18 CRIME Comm'N REPORT at 134.
19 Statement of Operation De Novo Pre-Trial Diversion Project, in Hearings on S.
33o9, at 63-64 [hereinafter cited as Statement of De Novo].
20 PA. P, CRIm. P. 175-85 (1975). The rules are reprinted in Hearings on S. 3309,
at 143-47.
21 See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3.
22 In Indiana any officer arresting for the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor
shall take the accused before a magistrate. InD. ANN. STAT. § 35-1-8-1 (Code ed. 1975).
Another statute commands any city police officer making an arrest "forthwith to bring
the person arrested before the city court, or court having jurisdiction of the offense, to
be dealt with according to law." IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-1-11-8 (Code ed. 1974).
23 Indiana provides by statute: "The defendant shall not be called upon to plead
until the court has advised him of his right to retain counsel and his right to be provided
with counsel at public expense if he is financially unable to retain counsel as provided by
law." IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4.1-1-2 (Code ed. 1975). Elsewhere it is provided that a
preliminary charge be prepared when one accused of a felony has been arrested and
detained:
[The officer] shall forthwith take such person before the magistrate, justice,
municipal, city, criminal or circuit judge, and shall cause [a preliminary charge]
to be prepared forthwith before the court hearing such matters ... and said
person so accused shall be entitled to a hearing thereon.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 354-1-1 (Code ed. 1975). The person charged "shall at said hearing
1975]
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often called the initial appearance.24 The next stage is the preliminary
hearing where a judge or magistrate determines whether probable
cause exists to "bind over" the accused for trial.2" After the binding
over, the prosecutor files his information or the grand jury may issue
an indictment.29 At arraignment the defendant must enter his formal
plea." If it is "not guilty" the case moves toward trial.28
Diversion removes the accused at an early stage of the criminal
process.2" Diversion programs vary upon which stage removal occurs.
The C.P.A. program (Michigan) diverts persons before the arrest
be apprised of the facts concerning the felony" and "that anything he may say may be
used against him" and shall also be advised "that he is entitled to legal counsel." Id. Af-
ter the hearing at which the accused has the opportunity to advance any explanation,
justification, excuse, alibi or denial, "[tihe court shall thereupon rule in discharge or
commitment." "Any person so committed on any such preliminary charge shall be en-
titled to bail. . . ." Id. Cf. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (bail).
24 See FFD. R. CyaM. P. 5.
25 See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-1-8-1, 35-3.1-1-1, 35-4-1-1 (Code ed. 1975).
26 "All prosecutions of crimes shall be instituted by the bringing of an information
or indictment by the prosecuting attorney, in a court with jurisdiction over the offense
charged." IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-3.1-1-1 (b) (Code ed. 1975).
27 See IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4.1-1-1 (Code ed. 1975).
28 For a general description of the criminal process existing among the state juris-
dictions see Y. KAmIsAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 4-15
(4th ed. 1974).
29A recent commentator has carefully summarized the various formal eligibility
criteria which nonaddict, adult diversion programs use for the intake decision. In gen-
eral these are:
Residency. The accused must be a resident of the city or county in which
the program operates.
Age. There is usually a minimum age requirement of 16 or 17 years and
there may also be an upper age limit of 25 to 45 years.
Charge. This criterion varies from program to program. In general new
programs begin cautiously, limiting admission to those charged with misdea-
meanors. As they mature and gain the confidence of criminal justice officials,
the criteria are expanded to cover nonviolent felonies. Motor vehicle law vio-
lators, narcotic addicts, and prostitutes are normally excluded.
Prior arrests. Some programs admit only accused first offenders; others
will admit persons with a record of one prior misdemeanor conviction; and still
others require only that the accused be a 'non-habitual offender.' Programs
usually begin with accused first offenders and gradually broaden their eligibility
standards to encompass those with prior records.
Unemployment. Since the Department of Labor which funded the early
programs emphasized a manpower approach to rehabilitation, subsequent pro-
grams also adopted under or unemployment as a condition for eligibility. How-
ever this requirement is not consistently enforced.
Note, supra note 2, at 832-33.
In addition, most diversion programs require their participants to assume moral re-
sponsibility for their alleged offenses. Under C.P.A. an accused must make a statement
admitting guilt to his C.P.A. staff worker, on the theory that the admission itself is of
therapeutic value. A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A., supra note 10, at 497. No written state-
ments are required. The Senate Report on S. 798 recognized that an "informal acknowl-
edgement of personal responsibility meets the needs of rehabilitation," but rejected the
notion that a formal guilty plea be required. S. REP. No. 417. at 14.
[Vol. 50:783
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and charge stages."0 This earliest of diversion models is called the pro-
secutor's model because removal occurs before any judicial input can
occur."' The prosecutor and his staff have total control of all stages
of the diversion process from intake to successful completion of the re-
habilitation program or termination from the program of the unsuccess-
ful. They are also totally responsible for advising the accused of his
constitutional rights and taking action to implement these rights.
Most of the other diversion programs divert the accused at the
initial appearance or bail hearing stage, but there is much diversity
among these programs in the amount of judicial supervision over intake.
In programs such as Operation De Novo the judge does nothing more
than grant a continuance if the accused agrees to be diverted. 2 Under
30 The Citizens Probation Authority (C.P.A.) is an autonomous agency, funded by
the Genesse County Board of Commissioners (Flint, Michigan), which has a professional
staff of counselors to rehabilitate those persons referred by the prosecutor's office. Coun-
seling services cover such areas as finances, education, employment training, marriage
and the family. A CAsa Sru n oF C.P.A. at 444, 449.
Under the C.P.A. diversion program, a number of assistant prosecutors are assigned
the task of initially screening out those persons who may be good subjects for deferred
prosecution. The assistant prosecutors keep in close contact with local police agencies
so that a C.P.A. referral can be made in a proper case before an arrest warrant is neces-
sitated. The prosecutor then refers the accused (client) to a Police Liaison and Train-
ing Officer (PLATO) for an interview. Id. at 471. PLATO then
[advises] the accused of his Constitutional rights, explain3 the nature of the
CPA program, secures the cooperation of the client and refers him to a staff
counselor for a work-up on the personal and social history of the client Cases
not meeting CPA criteria or who voluntarily withdraw from participation at the
intake stage are referred back to the prosecutor for further disposition.
Id. at 471. An accused who successfully completes the C.P.A. program is never charged
with a crime and often was not arrested prior to intake. He does not see a judge or the
inside of a courtroom. The typical C.P.A. participant does not have the advice of re-
tained or assigned counsel during the intake process. (This is seen as a substantial cost
saving for the county.) Id. at 482, 488. Typically the accused accepts a one-year "vol-
untary" probation program while prosecution is held in abeyance. The diversion agree-
ment may be revoked and formal prosecution of the case initiated if the "client" commits
a new offense. The decision to revoke is made by the C.P.A3 staff, but the prosecutor
makes the final determination. Although a C.P.A. counselor discusses the alleged new
offense with the "client," there is no opportunity for an adversarial hearing or the as-
sistance of counsel. Id. at 472.
3 1 NATiONAL Dismicr ATToRNEYs AsS'N, DEFERRED PROSECUTION (1974). The sub-
ject matter consultant for this manual is currently the Director of the Genesee County
Citizens Probation Authority. It is therefore no coincidence that the diversion model
proposed by the National District Attorneys Association is nearly identical to C.P.A.3 2 Statement of De Novo, supra note 19, at 65; Statement of William B. Henschel,
in Hearings on S. 3309, supra note 8, at 56.
The Hennepin County Pre-trial Diversion Project (Minneapolis, Minnesota) was
initially an 18-month experimental program begun in 1971 and funded by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor as one of several "second round" programs. Statement of De Novo,
supra, at 68. The program is patterned after the Manhattan Court Employment Project
and Project Crossroads in Washington, D.C. Id. at 71. Staff counselors for the re-
habilitation program include professionals and ex-offender paraprofessionals who are be-
lieved better qualified in breaking down the communications impasse between an offender
19751
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Senate Bill No. 798, the judge plays a more important role, deter-
mining whether the accused voluntarily agrees to such program and
knowingly and intelligently waives the statute of limitations and the
right to a speedy trial, and whether the accused's release is in the public
interest. 8 Under A.R.D. the judge makes a further inquiry on a
closed record. He must hear the facts of the case as presented by the
prosecutor and any victim and such information as the defendant or
his attorney may present. The defendant's statements may not be
used against him in any subsequent proceeding. Only then may the
judge grant diversion after stating the conditions of the program and
after the defendant acknowledges his agreement.3 ' In effect, before
and traditional counselor. Id. at 68. The program staff provided an intense six-month
period of personality development and vocational training. Id. at 64.
Program screeners interview defendants after arrest but just prior to arraignment-
usually in the courtroom. If the defendant meets the eligibility criteria and agrees to
participate, the screener informs the prosecutor. If the prosecutor decides to accept the
defendant for diversion he informs the judge, who grants a continuance for six months.
Once diverted, the defendant signs an agreement to cooperate with the project and to
waive his right to a speedy trial. He is then assigned to a counselor. The judge's only
function in the intake process is to grant the continuance and, if the defendant success-
fully completes the program, to dismiss the charges. Id. at 69. Although program pro-
cedures state that prospective participants shall have an opportunity to consult with coun-
sel, the screening procedures in reality do not permit the advice of assigned counsel.
Id. at 72. Cf. Note, supra note 2, at 841. Cf. also R. NIMmmm, supra note 1, at 53-65.
3 S. REP. No. 417, at 2. In October, 1973, the U.S. Senate passed bill S. 798, which
would have authorized and established procedures for pretrial diversion programs for
each federal court district. The Senate Judiciary Committee held lengthy hearings on
the subject of pretrial diversion, in which representatives from diversion projects through-
out the country explained their programs and commented on the proposed bill. See Hear-
ings on S. 3309 and Hearings on S. 798, supra note 3. S. 798, the revised form of S.
3309, was the products of these hearings.
The bill attempted to preserve the tradition of prosecutorial discretion while safe-
guarding the interest of the defendant and society during the intake procedure by impos-
ing certain judicial controls. Under S. 798 the U.S. attorney could recommend a person
charged with an offense be released to a program of community supervision and services
for up to 12 months, during which the charge is continued by a judge or magistrate. The
chief administrator of the program would have the duty to screen each person charged
with an offense and make recommendations to the U.S. attorney. The judge or magis-
trate could release the accused at the bail hearing or thereafter. S. REP. No. 417, at 2, 3.
Thus the U.S. attorney would retain the discretion to initiate diversion-but subject to a
judicial veto. S. 798 did not expressly provide for the right to counsel at the intake
process, but the Judiciary Committee's report stated that "defense counsel would play an
important role here." Id. at 6. The bill also forbade the use at any criminal proceeding
of any statements or information given by the defendant during the intake process or
program on the issue of his guilt. Id. at 2, 3.
The judge or magistrate could terminate the accused's release to the program "if the
attorney for the Government finds such individual is not fullfilling his obligations under
the plan applicable to him, or the public interest so requires." Id. at 3. The language
authorizing revocation arguably required the accused be granted a hearing before the
U.S. attorney since it required the attorney to "find" the facts which merit revocation.
34 PA. R. Clum. P. 175-85 (1975). The rules are reprinted in Hearings on S. 3309,
at 144-47. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1972 promulgated rules 175 to 185
which authorize a diversion procedure called "Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition"
[Vol. 50:783
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granting diversion the judge in A.R.D. determines probable cause and
a factual basis for believing the accused committed the crime.
Diversion programs also vary in the extent of the opportunity
for effective assistance of counsel at the intake stage for indigent
accuseds. Under the prosecutor's model an indigent need not be
afforded the assistance of counsel because he is diverted at a stage
preceding the initial appearance before a magistrate or judge." How-
ever, an accused is permitted counsel if he provides his own. Under
Operation De Novo, counsel is appointed at the intake stage but there
is no opportunity for intelligent advice of counsel before the accused
must decide on diversion." Under Senate Bill No. 798, the same
problem would exist if the accused is diverted at the bail hearing at
which counsel is appointed."
The stage of the criminal process at which diversion occurs has de-
termnned whether the accused receives constitutional safeguards. The
diagram illustrates the stages of the criminal process at which diversion
occurs in various programs. The balance of this note will discuss the
need for diversion to occur after the charge, judicial supervision and
assistance of counsel.
THE CHARGE AS A PREREQUISITE TO DIVERSION
Under the traditional criminal process the initiation of criminal
proceedings triggers the attachment of constitutional rights to protect
the accused from a miscarriage of justice. The sixth amendment right
to counsel has been held to apply only to those events occurring after
(A.R.D.). The rules establish elaborate judicial control over the diversion intake and
revocation process to safeguard the rights of the defendant.
The prosecutor in his discretion may move the court that a case be considered for
diversion either before or after the indictment or information stage. A hearing on the
prosecutor's motion is held in open court in the presence of the defendant, his counsel,
the prosecutor, and any victims of the alleged offense.
The rules require the judge to ask the defendant on record whlether he understands
that diversion gives him an opportunity for dismissal of the charge, that he may be tried
if he fails the program, and that he must waive his right to a speedy trial and the right
to invoke the statute of limitations.
The Pennsylvania rules also establish a judicially controlled procedure for the revo-
cation of a diversion agreement. The prosecutor may file a motion alleging the defendant
has violated a condition of the program. The defendant is granted a hearing at which
the judge may decide to terminate his program. The rules do not mention a right to
counsel at the revocation hearing. Under the rules the prosecutor's discretion in deciding
whether to divert is preserved, but the judge has a veto power over the diversion intake.
The prosecutor has the discretion to initiate a revocation hearing, but only the judge may
revoke after due process of law. Id.
835 See NArIoNAL DisTRcr ATTORNEYS ASs'N, DEFERRED PROSECUTION 43-45 (1974);
A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A. at 482.8 0Statement of DeNovo at 72; Note, supra note 2, at 841.87See FED. PK CRiM. P. 44.
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:783
DIVERSION FLOW CHART
First Counsel
Judicial Meets
Involvement with
Accused
Counsel
Appointed
Crime [B.icCharge
C.P.A.
(Prosecutor's )ivcrsion
Model)
S-798
Dc Novo
The chart above indicates the relationship among existing or proposed diversion pro-
grams, the chain of events in the criminal process leading to adjudication, and the points
along this chain at which the intervention of the court or the accused's attorney serves to
protect the accused's constitutional and statutory rights. The progression of events from
the alleged commission of a crime to adjudication represents the normal criminal process.
Procedural safeguards, here indicated in terms of judicial supervision of the prosecutor's
decision to proceed towards trial and in terms of the accused's access to appointed counsel,
are indicated at the stage of the proceedings at which they occur. Arrows dropping away
from the main sequence represent the diversion programs discussed in the text, each lead-
ing to the rehabilitation program indicated at lower right. For purposes of this note,
PRETRIAL DIVERSION
Determination
of probable
cause
Information or Arraignment Trial
Indictment (Plea) I 1
Model
Diversion
Hearing
A. R. D.
Community-Based
Rehabilitation Program
(Counseling, Training,
and Job Placement)
the significant differentiating feature of these diversion programs is the stage of the
normal criminal process at which the accused is diverted.
Procedures for safeguarding constitutional and statutory rights, most significantly
those involving judicial supervision and access to counsel, have been imposed upon par-
ticular stages of a state's criminal process by a case-by-case analysis of the function of
the particular stage and the putose of the constitutional right sought to be imposed at
that stage. Diversion, however, circumvents those stages and thereby may bypass the
attaching of constitutional safeguards assumed to inhere in the normal flow of events
from arrest to trial. The procedural safeguards shown above-judicial supervision and
access to counsel-serve to protect the entire range of statutory and constitutional rights
available to the accused.
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the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment." '88 The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has been
held to attach at the "formal indictment or information or else the
actual restraints imposed by an arrest and holding to answer a criminal
charge. .. "" The fourth amendment right to a probable cause
hearing has been held to attach whenever a person is significantly re-
strained in his liberty while awaiting trial."°
Under C.P.A. an accused enters a diversion program without
being charged or even arrested. The rationale given by supporters of
this policy is that the criminal stigma of a formal accusation is
avoided which thereby aids the accused towards rehabilitation. But
the accused unwittingly pays a high price for this "benefit" by foregoing
all of the constitutional safeguards that would unquestionably be due
him if he were charged.
For diversion programs generally, the formal charge is an essen-
tial tool for all of the parties in the criminal process. Defense counsel
can more effectively advise his client of the strengths and weaknesses
of the prosecutor's case in relation to a specific charge. It is doubtful
he can give his client the effective assistance of counsel in the absence
of a charge. The charge allows the defendant to better assess the seri-
ousness of his sitution by revealing the potential sentence, whether
he faces a misdemeanor or felony, and the degree of social stigma if
he is convicted. The judge cannot determine whether probable cause
exists in the absence of a charge. The prosecutor is induced to
examine more carefully the merits of his case if he must bring a specific
charge relating to his evidence."1
Although the courts have not held that there is a constitutional
right to be charged with a crime, C.P.A. presents the issue in a novel
context. Under C.P.A. the accused agrees to accept the restraints upon
his liberty and intrusions into his privacy involved in the rehabilitative
program in exchange for abeyance of prosecution." These restraints
88 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).89 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
40 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
&1 See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COmm'N, CoURTs, supra note 9, at 530-31.
42 Under the prosecutor's model the accused must sign an application for voluntary
probation in the Deferred Prosecution Program. The accused agrees not to "leave the
city/county/state without obtaining written permission" from his counselor, not to "know-
ingly associate with persons who violate the law," to "report to [his] counselor and par-
ticipate in counseling sessions as required," to "cooperate with any agency to which [he
is] referred," to "pay a Probation Service Fee" and to "pay any restitution required for
[the offense charged], as directed by [his] counselor." NATIONAL DisTmcr ArroaRNEYs
Ass'N, DaRma PosEcuTIoN 58 (1974).
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occur without a judicial determination of probable cause. In Gerstein
v. Pugh the Supreme Court held, in a case involving a defendant unable
to raise bail, that the fourth amendment requires a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause to justify a significant restraint on liberty pend-
ing trial. 3 The Court added that "[e]ven pretrial release may be accom-
panied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of
liberty."" Participation in a rehabilitative diversion program may pose
more burdensome restraints upon liberty than pretrial release restric-
tions upon an accused's travel, association or place of abode.'
It is true that a C.P.A. divertee is not subject to a court's contempt
power if he breaches a condition of the agreement, whereas under con-
ventional pretrial release procedures an accused could be held in con-
tempt for violating a condition of release.'" However the C.P.A.
divertee participates in the diversion program because of the threat of
prosecution and perhaps also in ignorance of alternatives. The results
are the same in terms of loss of liberty under both pretrial release
agreements and the so-called voluntary diversion agreement of C.P.A.
The rationale of Gerstein v. Pugh appears to mandate a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause before the accused enters a diversion
program. The issue of probable cause cannot be resolved in each in-
stance without a formal charge. Thus Gerstein v. -Pugh strongly sug-
gests that formal charging is a constitutional requirement of any diver-
sion procedure.
The question of whether the Constitution requires charging in the
diversion procedure also arises in the context of an accused's waiver of
his right to a speedy trial. That right cannot be knowingly and intel-
ligently waived without knowledge of the charge upon which one could
be tried. In United States v. Marion'7 the Supreme Court refused to
reverse a conviction on a charge which the prosecutor brought over three
years after the case was fully investigated. The defendant had argued
that the belated charge violated his right to a speedy trial. The Court
said that it is "a formal indictment or information or else the actual
restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge
4 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). "[The probable cause determination] is
required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial." Id. at 125 n.26.
I'Id. at 114.
45 See the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141-43, 3146-52, 3568 (1970).
The Court in Gerstein identified the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a) (2), (5) (1970)
as examples of potentially "significant restraint on liberty." 420 U.S. at 114.
"See Brown v. Fogel, 395 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1968) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3151 (1970).
'7404 U.S. 307 (1971).
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that engage the particular protections of speedy trial provision of the
Sixth Amendment."'" But this is so because until arrest or charge, "a
citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public
accusation. . . ."" As with the right to a probable cause hearing,
the right to a speedy trial evidently attaches when the state seeks to
restrain one's liberty. The restraints involved in the diversion program
would necessarily bring the right to speedy trial into play. Again an
accused could not waive this right without knowledge of the charge to
which the right attaches.
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF DIVERSION INTAKE-A
PROPOSED MODEL HEARING
There are four possible functions of judicial control exercisable
over the diversion intake process: (1) judicial veto power over the
prosecutor's decision that the accused is a fit subject for community
rehabilitation; (2) judicial review of the prosecutor's decision not to
divert; (3) judicial determination of probable cause; (4) judicial deter-
mination of whether the accused's acceptance of the diversion agree-
ment is made voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly.
First: A judicial veto power over the prosecutor's decision to
divert is designed to doubly protect society's interest that no person be
diverted who may be a danger to the community or whose offense
merits the full sanction of the criminal process. The interest of the
accused generally does not come into play in the exercise of this veto
power. Under C.P.A. this judicial power is not exercised because it
is believed that diversion is solely the prerogative of the prosecutor.
Most other diversion programs, however, have this feature of judicial
control. Senate Bill No. 798 provides that the judge may release the
accused to the diversion program if it is not contrary to the public in-
terest."0 Under A.R.D. the judge has the discretion to permit diversion
after hearing the facts of the case upon a closed record." Under other
programs the judge impliedly has such a veto power when he exercises
his discretion in granting the continuance.
Second: Generally diversion programs do not give the judge au-
thority to review the prosecutor's decision not to divert an individual. 2
48 Id. at 320.
49Id. at 321.
50 S. RE. No. 417, supra note 3, at 2.
51 PA. R. CRIm. P. 179 (1975).
52 But see the Connecticut Accelerated Rehabilitation Act, effective October 1, 1974,
which permits the court to invoke diversion on motion of the defendant or on motion of
a state's attorney. Before an amendment in 1974 the Act had originally placed the
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It is believed that such authority would improperly invade the prose-
cutor's traditional discretion. The U.S. Senate made painstakingly clear
when it amended the predecessor of S. 798 that the U.S. attorney had the
discretion to recommend individuals for diversion." Under A.R.D. the
prosecuting attorney has the discretion to move the court that the case
be considered for diversion." C.P.A. likewise preserves this aspect of
prosecutorial discretion, but its supporters have failed to distinguish
the absolute discretion not to divert from the unfettered discretion to
divert. One commentator has argued in favor of giving judicial control
over the prosecutor's decision not to divert.55 Although this would pro-
tect an accused desirous of a diversion opportunity from an arbitrary
decision, the net benefits must be weighed against changing a funda-
mental precept of our criminal process-the prosecutor's discretion.
Third: A judicial determination of whether probable cause exists
to believe the accused committed a crime appears to be constitutionally
mandated regardless of whether the accused is formally charged prior
to diversion. Under Senate Bill No. 798 a person cannot be recom-
mended for diversion without first being charged.3" Unquestionably
Gerstein v. Pugh mandates a probable cause hearing before the accused
is released to the type of federal diversion program as anticipated by
S. 798Y It would be the high-water mark of constitutional manipula-
tion to argue that C.P.A. can avoid the probable cause hearing by
the simple device of refusing to charge.
Fourth: The fourth possible function of judicial control over
the diversion intake could be patterned after the constitutional function
of a judge when a plea of guilty is accepted. In Boykin v. Alabama58
the Supreme Court held that the record of a guilty plea hearing must
show that the defendant voluntarily waived at least three constitutional
rights: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by
jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. In North Carolina v.
Alford, 9 where the defendant's plea of guilty was accepted by the judge
in spite of his assertions of innocence, the Supreme Court held that a
power to initiate diversion solely within the discretion of the state's attorney. CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 54-76p (Supp. 1975); Sullivan, Connecticut's Accelerated Rehabilitation Act,
49 CONN. B.J. 77 (1975).
5 S. REP. No. 417, at 5.
54 PA. 1. CalM. P. 175 (1975).
55 Note, supra note 2, at 844.
58 S. Rvx. No. 417, at 2.57See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 117, 125 n.26 (1975) ; see also text at
notes 43-46 supra.
58 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
59400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
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defendant may "voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly" consent
to the entry of a guilty plea without admitting his participation in the
crime if there is a "strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by
the State."6
Under the statutes of Indiana a court cannot accept a plea of guilty
from a defendant without first determining that he understands the
nature of the charge and advising him of various consequences of his
plea including waiver of the three constitutional rights enunciated in
Boykin v. Alabama.6 The Indiana courts must also determine that the
plea is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea.62
The impact upon an accused who agrees to accept a diversion
program is similar to that of a defendant who pleads guilty to a crime,
and therefore similar safeguards should be applied. At the guilty plea
hearing a defendant waives his privilege against self-incrimination, his
right to a jury trial, and the right to face his accusers. Acceptance of
the plea results in a conviction whereby a sentence may be imposed,
i.e., probation, prison, or a fine. By way of comparison, when an
accused accepts a diversion agreement he is usually required to accept
moral responsibility for the alleged offense, he will be required to
formally waive his rights to a speedy trial and to the invocation of the
statute of limitations. This agreement results in the accused's partici-
pation in a community-based rehabilitation program where he accepts
substantial restraints on his liberty and intrusions into his privacy often
more severe than those imposed under formal probation.
The divertee's agreement to accept moral responsibility for the al-
leged offense is in effect a self-incriminating statement. Other incrimin-
ating statements are likely to be induced by the divertee's contact with
counselors of the rehabilitation program. In the absence of a statute in
the particular jurisdiction making such statements inadmissible at a sub-
sequent trial in the event the divertee is terminated from the program,
such statements could be used by the prosecution to aid in a conviction.
Even where such a statute exists, incriminating statements could be
used to impeach the accused if he takes the witness stand at his own
trial.63 The trier of fact at a subsequent trial might perceive an accused's
participation in a terminated rehabilitation program as a damaging
admission of guilt. The acceptance of moral responsibility and participa-
tion in a diversion program might effectively ensure the accused's con-
60 Id. at 38.
61 IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4.1-1-3 (Code ed. 1975).
62 IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4.1-1-4 (Code ed. 1975).68Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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viction upon termination from the program even in jurisdictions with
immunity statutes because testimony from an accused who is actually
innocent could be effectively impeached by such evidence. The con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination should be adequately
protected by requiring a judicial determination that it is waived volun-
tarily, knowingly, and understandingly.
Because the waiver of the right to a speedy trial is only a postpone-
ment of the right to a trial, it may be seen as a less serious decision
than a waiver of a right to a trial which has the element of finality.
But the results of both types of waivers may be in fact the same if post-
ponement of trial means that exculpatory witnesses are no longer avail-
able because of death, absence from the jurisdiction, or if testimony
becomes unavailable because of faded memories.
Although the privilege against self-incrimination by itself does
not require a judicial determination of its voluntariness prior to its
actual waiver6 and the right to a speedy trial can be waived by simply
failing to assert it,"' it is the aggregate effect of these waivers in the
diversion context resulting in probation-like restraints upon liberty
that make a compelling argument that voluntariness of the diversion
agreement should receive the same judicial protection as is constitu-
tionally required for acceptance of a guilty plea.
Senate Bill No. 798 provided that an accused shall not be released
to a diversion program unless he has "voluntarily agreed to such pro-
gram, and he has knowingly and intelligently waived, in the presence
of the [judge or magistrate], any applicable statute of limitations
and his right to speedy trial for the period of his diversion." 8 A.R.D.
has a similar requirement.67 The National Advisory Commission recom-
mends that the court should approve a diversion agreement "only if it
would be approved under the applicable criteria if it were a negotiated
plea of guilty.""8
A model diversion hearing designed to adequately safeguard the
constitutional rights of an accused before diversion as well as to protect
society's interest in crime deterrence would require at a minimum a
judicial determination of whether (1) the accused is a fit subject for
community-based rehabilitation, (2) probable cause exists to believe
the accused committed the crime charged, and (3) the accused volun-
64 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966).
65See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
66 S. REP. No. 417, mipra note 3, at 2.
87P& R. CRim. P. 178, 179 (1975).
6 8 NATIONAL ADvisoRY CoMM'N, CouRTs, mipra note 9, at 539.
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tarily, knowingly, and intelligently agrees to the conditions of the di-
version program and waives the right to a speedy trial.
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT DIVERSION INTAKE
Counsel should be provided at diversion for three reasons. First,
the advice and assistance of counsel at diversion intake is essential to
prevent the innocent from being diverted, by virtue of their ignorance
of alternatives and lack of legal skill, and accepting restraints upon
their liberty and intrusions into their privacy involved in community-
based rehabilitation. Diversion of the innocent not only violates the
constitutional rights of the accused but also jeopardizes the integrity
of the diversion process itself.
Second, counsel would assist the judge in an intelligent decision
on whether the accused is a proper subject for a diversion programi
Finally, the advice of counsel before diversion would protect the
rights of the accused in case diversion is terminated and a trial be-
comes necessary. Diversion intake, whether acomplished by the model
diversion hearing or some less meaningful procedure, is for the accused
a "critical stage"eD in the process toward the trial which ultimately
69 The United States Supreme Court has held that the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments require the assistance of counsel at all "critical stages" of the criminal process.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) ; United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) ;
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamil-
ton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
The analysis the Court has employed in determining the contours of the "critical
stage" test were outlined in Wade, supra, where a post-indictment lineup was held to be a
critical stage, thus entitling the accused to assistance of counsel. Focusing on the nexus
between a defendant's rights at trial and police and prosecutorial conduct before trial that
may render these rights illusory, the Court scrutinized "this pretrial confrontation of the
accused [the lineup] to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to
preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to
cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have the assistance of counsel at the trial
itself." 388 U.S. at 227. This approach was followed in Coleman v. Alabama, supra,
where the Court, quoting the language from Wade given above, found that Alabama's
preliminary hearing was likewise a critical stage in which the defendant must be given
assistance of counsel. More closely defining "critical stage" to exclude nonadversarial
steps in the prosecutor's preparation of the case (e.g., post-indictment display of photo-
graphs to witnesses to aid in identification), the Court in Ash v. United States, supra, re-
garded a critical stage as one in which the accused himself is present at a "trial-like ad-
versary confrontation." 413 U.S. at 317. Thus, identifying pretrial events affecting the
accused as "critical stages" proceeds from a functional analysis: an "examination of the
event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal prob-
lems or assistance in meeting his adversary." Id. at 313. The limitnig factor in this
functional analysis is that if "confrontation with counsel at trial can serve as a substitute
for counsel at the pretrial confrontation," id at 316, then presence of counsel would not
be critical.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that the initial judicial
determination of probable cause to arrest was not a "critical stage" requiring the presence
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threatens him if he fails or quits the diversion program. At diversion
intake the accused for the first time is on notice that the government be-
lieves he has committed a crime. He is suddenly faced with the awesome
decision of either attempting to exonerate himself of any wrongdoing
or of undergoing rehabilitation and thereby waiving and possibly pre-
judicing his right to a fair trial.
The fairness of a subsequent trial may be prejudiced because rights
exercisable at diversion intake are irretrievably lost. Diversion always
involves waiver of the right to a speedy trial, some type of acceptance
of moral responsibility for the offense, and subsequent interaction with
program counselors who expect and demand that the accused "come
clean" with his social problem. Delay in the preparation for trial may
mean exculpatory evidence is forever lost. Participation in a diver-
sion program may lay the foundation for an effective impeachment at
a subsequent trial where an accused asserts his innocence on the stand.
Because the fairness of a subsequent trial cannot be guaranteed without
counsel's presence at diversion intake, it is a critical stage of the crim-
inal process at which the sixth amendment requires the assistance of
counsel.7"
of accused's counsel, in part because of the nature of the hearing involved: the sole issue
to be decided-probable cause-is whether there was proper cause to arrest-not whether
there is sufficient evidence to take the accused to trial. Id. at 120. The Court identified
several factors which take such a hearing out of the "critical stage" category: the hear-
ing is by tradition nonadversary; the hearing performs a limited function; it was not
among "those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused
is required to proceed without counsel," id. at 122, since the pretrial detention occasidned
by the finding of probable cause would not disable the accused's counsel from ultimately
building a case, and since the absent accused could not, through active participation with-
out counsel, compromise himself before trial. Id. at 121-23.
The rationale of the "critical stage" appears to be that the accused may secure coun-
sel before trial because he must have effective counsel at trial. Diversion, however, seeks
to forgo trial; unlike the probable cause hearing in Gerstein, rights foreclosed by diver-
sion cannot be vindicated at trial. If there is not, in fact, suficient evidence to go to
trial, or if the evidence is excludable as the result of an illegal search, or if the defendant
has a credible affirmative defense, then a probable cause hearing need not be a critical
stage for the litigation of these issues since the normal criminal process anticipates their
resolution shortly thereafter. The accused's agreement to participate in diversion, how-
ever, has foreclosed the building of a defense, the calling of witnesses, the discovery of
evidence. The divertee's agreement to forgo any trial at all, in exchange for conditional
liberty, would seem to be a functionally "critical stage" under the rationale of the cases
culminating in Gerstein.7o See note 69 supra. But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972), where the
plurality opinion announced that "a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judiciA proceedings have been
initiated against him." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). But the significance
of attaching the right to counsel to the initiation of formal judicial proceedings was as-
sumned in Kirby to stem from the fact that, in the ordinary case, it is at this stage for
the first time that the prosecutor commits himself to disposition of the case:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism.
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The right to counsel also includes the right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel.71 Counsel should have a reasonable amount of time
to consult with the accused, have an investigation conducted if neces-
sary, and assess the case before he is required to advise his client on
the merits of diversion. This should also include the discovery rights
granted by the jurisdiction. The diversion programs established to date
generally do not permit court-appointed counsel an adequate opportunity
to assess the case against the accused. Under Senate Bill No. 798, for
example, the accused may be diverted as early as the bail hearing
(initial appearance before the magistrate), the first stage at which
counsel may be appointed." A diversion program requiring the accused
to decide on whether to accept or reject a diversion agreement as early
as the initial appearance (or equivalent) would deny him the effective
assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the criminal process.
METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Programs diverting persons from the criminal process have
grounded their authority in prosecutorial discretion, court rule, or
statute.
Prosecutorial Discretion
The C.P.A. program is not authorized by Michigan statute or
court rule,"' but is said to be merely a proper exercise of prosecutorial
discretion74 which is derived from the separation of powers clause of
the Michigan constitution."5 It is even claimed that legislative authori-
zation of C.P.A. would be an encroachment upon the executive power
of the prosecutor."8 The supporters of C.P.A. do not address the
It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For
it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only
then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It
is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law.
406 U.S. at 689. Yet diversion does not generally make judicial proceedings "the starting
point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice!'; it does not permit adverse posi-
tions to solidify; yet the accused faces the considered commitment of the prosecutor to
act, if not to prosecute; and the accused faced with an offer of diversion faces a critical
decision in which a knowledge of "the intricacies of substantive and procedural law"-
and constitutional law-seems necessary.
7 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
72 See FED. . CGlm. P. 5; S. REP. No. 417, at 2 (bail hearing).
73 A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A., mtpra note 10, at 486.
7Id. at 487, 488; cf. Comment, Non-Trial Disposition of Criminal Offenders: A
Case Study, 5 J. LAw REFoRm 453,456 (1972).
75 A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A. at 488; Comment, supra note 74, at 454-56.
76 A CASE STUDY OF C.P.A. at 488.
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question of whether C.P.A. encroaches partially on a judicial func-
tion.7 Although C.P.A. supporters admit that the "program is a
sufficiently basic alteration of the prosecutor's standard operating
procedures to bring into question the proper scope of the discre-
tion.. ., " they present the following argument that C.P.A. does not
expand traditional discretion:
CPA actually regulates that discretion within proper bounds. Every
prosecutor's office engages in large-scale diversion of offenders
through plea-bargaining, refusal to prosecute, or similar practices.
If there are no controlling criteria, this diversion takes place on an
ad hoc basis and may be influenced by illegal factors such as class
or racial prejudice or political pressure.79
It is one thing to argue that C.P.A. permits a more intelligent use
of prosecutorial discretion and quite another to imply that discretion
includes the unfettered power to induce restraint of an accused's liberty
through the threat of prosection.
As a general rule the prosecutor's powers are not subject to
judicial review except for abuse of discretion."0 In practice this means
he could not be compelled to charge, to dismiss a charge, or to reduce a
charge by a third party or by a court."' But when the prosecutor's deci-
sion results in significant restraints upon an accused, the Constitution
requires the courts to intervene for the protection of the accused's
rights.12 It is a constitutional precept that the prosecutor's responsi-
bility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the dtty of protecting the
rights of the person he accuses." Thus the prosecutor's discretion to
initiate the criminal process or to terminate it must be separated from
the power to determine whether an accused shall be restrained of his
liberty. Although the ad hoc diversion practice resulting in restraint
of liberty is well documented in the literature, 4 the occasion to chal-
lenge its unfettered exercise in the courts never arose because of its
7 See Comment, supra note 74.
78 ACASE STUDY OF C.P.A. at 488; Comment, supra note 74, at 456.
70 Comment, supra note 74, at 456.
80 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ; Newman v. Urited States, 382 F.2d 479
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963); CRImE COM'N
REPORT, supra note 10, at 133; Baker, The Prosecuting A ttorncy: Legal Aspects of the
Office, 26 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 647 (1935). See generally F. MLLER, PROSECUTION: THE
DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT wrrH A CRIME (1970).
Si See F. MILLER, supra note 80.
82Sec Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), holding that there must be a judicial
determination of probable cause before a suspect can be sigrificantly deprived of his
liberty. See also notes 43-45, 69-70 supra & text accompanying.
8s Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (1975).
84 See note 12 supra.
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low visibility and informality. But the new pretrial diversion concept
with its large staffs for methodical screening and its large scale re-
habilitation programs raises this use of prosecutorial discretion from
an academic question to a justiciable constitutional issue.
C.P.A.'s reliance upon prosecutorial discretion as its authority for
the diversion intake without any judicial control after the discretionary
decision is made presents serious constitutional difficulties. C.P.A.'s
constitutional problems arise from its perception of the diversion pro-
cess as solely an executive function instead of an integrated function of
the executive and judicial branches.
In Indiana, a county prosecuting attorney holds a constitutional
office85 carved out of the office of the attorney general as it existed at
common law."6 He is vested with discretionary power to determine
who shall be prosecuted and who shall not be prosecuted.8 7 Judges
and courts may not substitute their discretion for that of the prosecut-
ing attorney.88 A prosecutor may nolle pross by oral or written motion
stating the reasons therefor and the court shall dismiss the charge.8 9
In light of the Indiana prosecutor's constitutional office, pretrial
diversion programs set up in Indiana should preserve his discretion,
which necessarily includes the discretion to initiate diversion. But his
discretion should not be used to bypass the judicial function, as is
done in the C.P.A. program.
Court Rule
Several pretrial diversion projects have been authorized by state
supreme courts. The A.R.D. program of Philadelphia0 and the
Hudson County Pre-trial Intervention Project" are examples of pro-
grams using specific procedures promulgated by a state supreme court.
The Indiana Supreme Court in 1937 received rulemaking au-
thority from the legislature over all practice and procedure in the state
courts.92 But the Indiana Supreme Court has held that it also has in-
herent power to prescribe rules,9" a power which one commentator
85 IND. CoNST. art. 7, § 11 provides in part: "There shall be elected in each judicial
circuit by the voters thereof a prosecuting attorney, who shall hold his office for four
years ......
86 State ex rel. Neerlemer v. Daviess Cir. Ct, 236 Ind. 624, 142 N.E.2d 626 (1957);
State ex reL. Williams v. Ellis, 184 Ind. 307, 112 N.E. 98 (1916).
87 State ex rel. Spencer v. Criminal Ct, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1938).
88 State ex reL Freed v. Martin Cir. Ct, 214 Ind. 152, 14 N.E.2d 910 (1938).
89 IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-3.1-1-13 (Code ed. 1975).
90See PA. R. Cpim. P. 175-85 (1975).
91 N.J.R. CraM. P. 3.28 (1970).92 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-5-2-1, -2 (Code ed. 1973).
9S Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920).
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has reasoned is derived from the "separation of powers" clause of the
Indiana constitution."' In spite of the court's rulemaking power the
legislature has often enacted procedural statutes even when statutes
grant the rulemaking power to the courts.9" The Indiana Supreme
Court has held that the power to make rules of procedure ig neither
exclusively legislative nor exclusively judicial." But a supreme court
rule supersedes any statute which may conflict with it. 7 Thus the
Indiana Supreme Court or the Indiana legislature could prescribe pro-
cedural rules for pretrial diversion.
The Indiana legislature has also granted to the trial courts "the
power to establish rules for their own government, supplementary to
and not conflicting with the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or
any statute."9 " The supreme court has also held that a local court rule
is void if it conflicts with a statute.9
Although a supreme court rule establishing procedures for the
diversion of offenders would evidently be the preferred method of
initiating pretrial diversion in Indiana, local county officials in coopera-
tion with the circuit and superior court judges could draft diversion
procedures for promulgation by the local courts. The Indiana legis-
ture approved of the diversion concept in passing the Indiana Drug
and Alcohol Abuse Act, which establishes procedures for the diversion
of drug and alcohol abusers charged with a crime.1 The Act also
recommends that certain municipal courts may in their discretion
establish an alcoholic rehabilitation program and promulgate rules for
its operation."' The Act, however, requires that program treatment be
given in lieu of penalties prescribed for persons convicted of alcohol-
related offenses." 2 An extension of the drug abuse diversion concept
to include non-drug abusers would not appear to conflict with any
statute or supreme court rule.
Legislative Act
The legislatures of Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New
94 Note, The Court v. the Legislature: Rule-Making Power in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J.
87, 88 (1960).
95 Id.
State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Cir. Ct., 239 Ind. 394, .399, 157 N.E.2d 475. 477
(1959).97Neeley v. State, - Ind. -, 305 N.E.2d 434 (1974).
98 IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-5-2-2 (Code ed. 1973).
99 State et r. Zellers v. St. Joseph Cir. Ct, 247 Ind. 394, 216 N.E.2d 548 (1966).
1-0 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-13-6.1-16, -30 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
101 IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-13-6.1-30 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
102 Id. § 16-13-6.1-16.
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York have enacted drug addict diversion procedures. °3 The Narcotics
Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 and section 404(b) of the Con-
trolled Substances Act are federal examples of drug addict diversion
programs authorized by statute.' However drug addict diversion
programs often provide for civil commitment in lieu of prosecution
instead of a "voluntary" community-based program.' Senate Bill
No. 798 was the first congressional attempt at legislating procedures
for nonaddict diversion.
If the Indiana legislature decides to enact nonaddict diversion pro-
cedures, the Indiana Drug and Alcohol Abuse Act would be a useful
model. The Act sets out limiting criteria for diversion intake." It
preserves the prosecutorial discretion by requiring his consent to de-
ferral of the trial, but it requires the court to make the final determina-
tion of whether an accused is a drug abuser and is likely to be re-
habilitated through treatment. °7 The court is also required to advise
the accused of the consequences of his election to accept the treatment
program.0 8 A questionable feature of the Act is the requirement that
an accused consent to a trial by the court in order to be acceptable
for diversion." 9
CONCLUSTON
Pretrial diversion to community-based rehabilitation programs may
well prove essential in reducing crime, economizing judicial resources,
and humanely treating lawbreakers desirous of becoming law-abiding;
but traditional constitutional safeguards shielding the accused must be
incorporated into diversion procedures to prevent diversion of the in-
nocent and to protect the integrity of the diversion concept.
Early diversion from the criminal process bypasses the constitu-
tional protections which normally come into play at later stages of the
process. In the proposed model diversion program, intake is postponed
until the accused is apprised of the charge, counsel has been retained
or appointed with adequate time to assess the case, and a judicial hear-
ing is held. At the model judicial hearing, the accused, his counsel, the
prosecutor, and possibly witnesses are present, and the judge must
108 Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 60 GEo. L.J. 667, 676-77 (1972).
10428 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 844(b) (1) (1970).
105 Note, supra note 103, at 677 nn.48 & 49.
06 IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-13-6.1-16 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
T0 7 IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-13-6.1-17 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
108 Id
109 Id.
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determine whether (1) the accused is a fit subject fcr community-based
rehabilitation, (2) probable cause exists to believe the accused com-
mitted the crime charged, and (3) the accused voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently agrees to the conditions of the program and waives
the right to a speedy trial.
Implementation of a model diversion procedure in Indiana should
be done by promulgation of rules of court or by legislation. Such rules
or statute should preserve the prosecutor's authority under the Indiana
constitution by allowing him the discretion to recommend diversion to
the supervising trial court on a case-by-case basis.
KENNETH W. MACKE
